Pax Africa hosts Barizi on Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the DRC

Peacemaking in the DRC
South Africa has been involved in peacemaking in the DRC since President Mandela’s first peace initiative in 1997. Despite the signing of a number of peace agreements, the holding of democratic elections and ongoing mediation efforts, the eastern DRC is not at peace.
The key actors in the ongoing conflict include:

* CNDP: Launched by Gen. Nkunda in 2006 to defend the interests of the Tutsi population, the CNDP was initially made up of troops from the RCD-Goma, though it has grown to include a diverse range of members. The CNDP signed an agreement with the Government of the DRC on 23 March 2009 and has been converted from an armed group into a political party, with most of its troops and police integrated into the national structures.
* FDLR: The extremist core of the FDLR is composed of former members of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and Interahamwe militias linked to the Rwandan genocide, though there are many members not associated with genocide, either because they were too young or were recruited later in the DRC. Military offences by the armed forces of the DRC (FARDC) with MONUC and Rwandan support have weakened the FDLR, who are no longer a military threat to Rwanda. However they continue to commit atrocities against the civilian population.
* PARECO/ Mai Mai: The Mai Mai are community-based militias formed to defend their local territory against other armed groups. They are not a unified structure. The leader of PARECO, a major Mai Mai group in North Kivu, agreed to demobilize in March 2010.
* ACPLS: A primarily Hunde armed militia, the ACPLS began integration into the FARDC but withdrew due to disputes over ranks and pay, as well as concern about CNDP control over certain areas.
* FARDC: The armed forces of the DRC are made up of 14 integrated brigades of fighters from more than 50 different former warring factions. The integration process was insufficient, and soldiers are generally poorly trained and not regularly paid. Poor training and difficult conditions in the FARDC have led to allegations of human rights abuses by FARDC soldiers.

Current situation
The 23 March 2009 peace agreement between the Government of the DRC and the CNDP has faced a number of hurdles. Both sides blame the other for delays in implementation. It is essential that the agreement be fully implemented in the interest of peace in the east.
* At present, the CNDP is divided between factions aligned to Rwanda and more locally oriented factions.
* Armed groups in the east control the exploitation of minerals and other resources. Access to resources (including minerals, land and others) remains a key cause of conflict.
* The Government of the DRC does not have control over all of the territory. Some is under administrative control of the CNDP or other groups. Even when the FARDC makes military gains, it is often unable to maintain them.
* DRC’s neighbours continue to interfere (especially Rwanda and Uganda).
Outstanding issues
Some of the key issues that must be resolved to bring peace to the eastern DRC include:
* Non-implementation of the 23 March 2009 agreement, especially in terms of recognition of ranks of former CNDP fighters; creating conditions for the return of refugees and IDPs; full political integration of CNDP (inclusion in cabinet and the AMP, Alliance pour la Majorité Presidentielle); and dismantling the CNDP’s parallel administration in Masisi.
* Issues of ethnicity and identity. There are concerns about the return of undocumented Tutsi refugees--some Congolese communities doubt their citizenship and accuse Rwanda of trying to infiltrate Congolese territory. There are also challenges around land and property ownership.
* The FDLR: The extremist core is preventing other members from demobilising. A new solution is required that might allow some FDLR members to resettle within the DRC, and greater incentives for demobilisation are required.

Peacebuilding

Four key areas that would contribute to sustainable peace in the DRC have been identified. These are:
a) Security Sector Reform (SSR): Currently the security sector is unable to provide security to the population or to maintain territorial integrity. The process of integration of the FARDC is incomplete, and new armed groups continue to appear and require integration. There is a need for a unified framework for SSR, improved coordination amongst international partners and a broad human security approach that incorporates all elements of the security sector. SSR is critical to the reestablishment of government authority.
b) Development and Peace Dividends: There is a need for massive infrastructure development to allow movement of people and goods in the east. This would contribute to development and provide alternative livelihoods to militia group members. The civilian administration must also be extended to deliver services to remote areas in eastern DRC.
c) Political and Economic Governance Reform: This is required to strengthen democratic participation (especially at local level) and to remove one of the causes of conflict (a feeling of marginalisation).
d) National Unification: The eastern DRC currently looks more to its neighbours (Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi) for trade, due to the huge physical and psychological distance between Kinshasa and the east. Infrastructure to connect the country is required.
Lessons for international engagement based on an assessment of South Africa and other international partners’ engagement in the DRC, the following lessons have been identified:Select a few key priority areas, based on comparative advantage, strategic interest and the needs of the DRC

* Improve coordination between government departments, amongst international partners and with the DRC government
* Ensure implementation through monitoring, follow-up and on-the-ground presence
* Undertake joint needs and impact assessments with the DRC.

During discussion it was noted that lack of capacity in the DRC frequently inhibits implementation of agreed peacebuilding projects. Therefore, capacity building must be a component of all projects. Coordination has been a challenge for South Africa, because sixteen different government departments have been engaged in peacebuilding in the DRC.

Recommendations
 

Peacemaking
Political aspects

* Press the DRC government to implement peace agreements and provide support if needed.
* Press the DRC and Rwanda to consider alternatives for the FDLR.
* Countries hosting FDLR leadership should bring them to justice.
* DRC’s neighbours should play a positive role in peacemaking.

Military aspects

* Continue to support MONUC (UN Mission in the DRC).

Economic aspects

* Invest in infrastructure projects, beginning with linkage roads between major towns in the east to open up markets, catalyze trade and enable population movements into the interior (Goma-Walikale, Beni-Butembo-Goma axes).

Regional/Multilateral Aspects

* The AU and SADC should take a more active role in peacemaking (possibly mediation) and peacebuilding (coordination, monitoring, etc).
* Preparations should be undertaken for a regional stabilisation mechanism to avoid a security vacuum when MONUC draws down. The AU provided such a mission in Burundi after the UN mission ended.
Consultative
* Consider a regional conference to develop alternatives for the FDLR, possibly under the framework of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region, ICGLR.
* SADC should engage in an assessment of progress and challenges for the various peace initiatives in the DRC.

Peacebuilding

Political

* Support implementation of peace agreements.
* DRC government must provide leadership and coordinate peacebuilding assistance, to ensure alignment with the country’s needs. International partners should also improve coordination from their side, to prevent waste of resources or duplication of efforts.
* Regional governments should support peace.
* Increased roles for SADC and the AU (e.g. electoral support, SSR, stabilisation mechanism). SADC has been planning to open an office in the DRC since 2006 but this has not happened.
Financial/ Economic
* Mobilise support for stabilisation and development projects (energy, natural resources, infrastructure—especially transport, and agriculture sectors).
* Support regional integration, through the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) and other RECs.

Technical Support

* Training and mentoring of the security sector.
* Training and mentoring of the civilian administration. The issue of non-payment of salaries of civil servants should also be addressed.
* Electoral support.
* Mediation and reconciliation support (at community level), as well as promotion of social cohesion.
* Capacity building across all sectors.

During discussion it was noted that all of the recommendations require resources. The DRC does not have sufficient resources for all of the peacebuilding projects required, and international partners seem unwilling or unable to provide sufficient funds. DRC must take ownership of peacebuilding efforts and ensure their sustainability.
It was also noted that the DRC has an incredible wealth of natural resources, and immense energy potential. Some parts of the DRC are already at peace and beginning to see development, though recent incidents of violence in some regions demonstrate the fragility of the peace. The process in the east has highlighted the importance of addressing impunity, to discourage the use of armed violence to access political power.

For any information on Pax Africa’s Barizi Policy Forum, or material relating to the African peace and security agenda, email info@paxafrica.org or call 012 342 7617.